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CULTURAL CRITIQUE AND LEGAL CHANGE
Charles W. Collier*
In Emerging Centrist Liberalism,, Mark Kelman locates postwar
"centrist" legal discourse within a universe of competing and evolving
political traditions. After considering the legal process school, law and
economics, and Critical Legal Studies, Kelman concludes that "[u]lti-
mately... I suspect that.., the Critical Race Theorists and feminists
pose[ ] a considerably more interesting foil for the centrists. '2 In this
comment I shall explore that proposition by analyzing in more detail
a few main contributions of these newer legal traditions and construct-
ing (or imagining) centrist responses to them.
Mark Kelman has previously written iluminatingly,' if controver-
sially, 4 on what might be termed the "reach" of the criminal law. He
has developed a highly suggestive and useful conception of the "time
frame," an interpretive construct through which we view (or decide
in advance how to view) intent, voluntary acts, criminal events, and
the defendant's status and personal historyA Kelman's thesis is that
such time frames are artificially or arbitrarily and perhaps politically
constructed, before the stage of rational legal argumentation, and usu-
ally at the expense of the defendant. 6 Here issues regarding the "reach"
of the law arise, such as: Should the criminal law consider a murder
defendant's "age, grade, intelligence, experience, and training, '7 his
"rotten social background,"8 or her history of being a "battered
woman"?9
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A. 1972, Reed College; M.A. 1973,
M. Phil. 1975, Ph.D. 1978, Yale University; J.D. 1985, Stanford Law School.
I should like to thank Diana Tennis for providing valuable research assistance.
1. Kelinan, Emerging Centrist Liberalism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 417 (1991).
2. Id. at 437.
3. See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981).
4. See Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, Appendix 1, 36
STAN. L. REV. 413, 456-61 (1984).
5. Kelman, supra note 3, at 593-600.
6. See id. at 591-673.
7. See United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 547 (1973) (Darden, C.J., dissenting).
8. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
9. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Kelman's discussion of the reach of the criminal law could be ex-
tended in a number of directions, and a similar analysis could be
applied to the "cultural critiques" of the Critical Race Theorists and
feminists discussed in Emerging Centrist Liberalism. These cultural
critiques often impart legal significance to conduct and areas of life
that had hitherto been considered beyond the reach of the law and
thus beyond its sanctions and protections. The archetypical centrist
response is to ask: Should legal rights and liabilities be recognized in
these new domains? If so, can legal remedies and reforms be designed
to protect and enforce those rights and liabilities (without thwarting
other, more important social goals and aspirations)?
The main contribution of the new left academic revisionist critiques
to political and legal discourse is to shift attention from economy to
culture. The cultural critiques are "most convincing[ ]," writes Kelman,
when they emphasize that "people genuinely suffer from cultural as-
saults as much as from material deprivation.' ' 10 This new emphasis is
a needed corrective to the work of traditional leftists, who
focused monomaniacally on poverty as the privileged form
of politically cognizable pain .... In fact, in materially pros-
perous economies, we may not always be able to draw sharp
distinctions between financial want and cultural assault. Rel-
ative deprivation may jeopardize one's sense of self-worth
or belonging in the community more than one's capacity to
survive or live free from physical pain.11
This emphasis on "cultural assault" might usefully shape the agenda
for a brave new world in which a more "expansive understanding of
individual need[s]"1 2 reflected the displacement, if not disappearance,
of material deprivation as the dominant form of individual need. In
our world, however, the latest economic data point rather strikingly
to the exact opposite prospect. The most recent Census Bureau reports
show that "[t]he poverty rate rose sharply last year and the incomes
of Americans declined. 13 Indeed, the incidence of poverty today is
"higher than at any time in the 1970's.14 Perhaps most noteworthy
L. REV. 379 (1991); Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. RFV. 619 (1986) (authored by David L. Faigman).
10. Kelman, supra note 1, at 437.
11. Id.
12. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 84 (1983).
13. DeParle, Poverty Rate Rose Sharply Last Year as Incomes Slipped, N.Y. Times, Sept.
27, 1991, at Al, col. 3 (national ed.).
14. Id. at All, col. 2.
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is the fact that this decline in real income was not at all the result of
"relative deprivation" in Kelman's sense;15 in fact, "differences nar-
rowed in the earnings between blacks and whites and between men
and women."'1 These and similar data, 17 along with persistent reports
of ever-rising homelessness, 18 indicate clearly that cultural deprivation
has not somehow eclipsed economic need as the dominant social, polit-
ical, or legal issue.
To invoke these economic realities, however, is not to deny that
"needs are not merely physical phenomena."' 9 They are perceived,
reflected upon, and interpreted "as" needs only within a complicated
human context of historically, politically, and culturally constituted
assumptions, priorities, collective values, shared understandings, and
expectations. 20 Thus, however the true state of "need" may be nar-
rowly defined in economic terms, the "cultural construction" of socially
recognized deprivation remains interesting and important in its own
right.
The new left academic revisionist analysis of "cultural assault,"
conducted under the rubric of "words that wound," presents the cen-
trist with important perplexities regarding the reach of the law. The
two cultural critiques that Kelman mentions in this context are Del-
gado, Words That Wound2z and Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech.22
15. See Kelman, supra note 1, at 437 (discussing "relative deprivation").
16. DeParle, supra note 13, at All, col. 1 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., McFATE, JOINT CENTER FOR POL. & ECON. STUD., POVERTY, INEQUALITY
AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL POLICY (1991); O'Hare, Pollard, Mann & Kent, African Americans
in the 1990s, 46 POPULATION BULL., No. 1, at 27-33 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference
Bureau, Inc., July 1991).
18. See, e.g., Morgan, Bulldozing Their Shanties, New York Evicts Squatters, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1991, at B12, col. 1 (national ed.); Purdum, Wanted: Homes for Homeless Shelters,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1991, at E16, col. 4 (national ed.); Dugger, Benefits of System Luring
More Families to Shelters, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (national ed.); Mayo's
Aide for Policy on Homeless Quits, id. at A20, col. 1 (referring to the "growing frustration"
that city officials have experienced in coping with "a homeless population that has reached crisis
proRortions"); Wilkerson, Shift in Feelings on the Homeless: Empathy Turns into Frustration,.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1991, at Al, col. 2 (national ed.).
19. M. WALZER, supra note 12, at 76.
20. See id. at 66-67, 82.
21. Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words that Wound]; see
also Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U.L.
REV. 343 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules] (examining universities' reg-
ulation of racist speech).
22. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320 (1989).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Richard Delgado's critique focuses on racial insults as a form of
cultural assault. Delgado has exhaustively canvassed the social science
literature on the effects of verbal racism2s and proposed a new tort
action to combat racial insults.- It is clear that at least some of the
racial insults described by Delgado fall within the recognized "fighting
words" exception to First Amendment protection? (though it should
be noted that the Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction on the
basis of that doctrine since its inauguration in 1942).26 But much of
what Delgado considers actionable can by no stretch of the legal imag-
ination be termed "fighting words," at least as the Court has under-
stood that term.2 Thus, for example, in Delgado's scheme "boy" might
be actionable, "depending on the speaker's intent, the hearer's under-
standing, and whether a reasonable person would consider it a racial
insult in the particular context. '"
The breadth of Delgado's perspective is breathtaking: Racial insults
"are in no way comparable to . . . 'mere insult[s].' Racial insults are
different qualitatively because they conjure up the entire history of
racial discrimination in this country. . . . Thus the defendant is, in
effect, a joint tortfeasor along with all others, past and present, who
have perpetuated racism.'" And even when the plaintiff cannot show
"tangible harms," reasons Delgado, "juries should be free to set dam-
ages, within reasonable limits, in order to deter other wrongdoers. ' '1 °
Furthermore, "punitive damages may often be appropriate."'1
23. See Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 21, at 135-49.
24. See id. at 179-80. In order to prevail in an action for a racial insult, the plaintiff would
be required to prove that "[1]anguage was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was
intended to demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood [the language] as
intended to demean through reference to race; and that a reasonable person would recognize
[the language] as a racial insult." Id. at 179.
25. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Delgado, Words that Wound,
supra note 21, at 172-73, 174-75 & n.241.
26. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1073-75 (12th ed. 1991); G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN,
C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1100 (2d ed. 1991).
27. See Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 531, 536-37 (1980) (describ-
ing Supreme Court's understanding of "fighting words" as words that are intentionally uttered
face-to-face to an individual, constitute an extremely provocative insult, and would cause an
immediate violent response by the average addressee); Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 508-14.
28. Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 21, at 180.
29. Id. at 157, 169 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 comment d, illustration 4 (1965)).
30. Id. at 168.
31. Id.
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Delgado takes pains to disassociate himself from "white, male,
middle-class lawyers who care a great deal about free speech."32.These
centrists lack "politico-moral standing" to "speak[ ] for the victims of
racial abuse," at least partially because they "care[ ] a great deal
about free speech but care[ ] less about eliminating racism in society."
That juxtaposition - and the suggestion that it somehow reflects an
inherent opposition between mutually exclusive alternatives - goes
a long way toward explaining centrist perplexities with positions like
Delgado's.
Another influential new left cultural critic, Mari J. Matsuda, "takes
inspiration from Professor Delgado's position, and makes the further
suggestion that formal criminal and administrative sanction - public
as opposed to private prosecution - is also an appropriate response
to racist speech." A key assumption in her analysis is that "there is
a connection between racist words and racist deeds," which is doubt-
less true. But instead of advocating more severe punishment for racist
deeds, and the verbal incitement to them, Matsuda urges the adoption
of a treaty that would "declare as an offense punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred. 3 6 Evi-
dently, it is even more efficient to ban ideas before they become
expressed in words (not to mention deeds). While acknowledging that
Hitler, too, had banned ideas, Matsuda points out "that anti-Semitic
hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected."3 7
In Matsuda's scheme of things, the human being is a very lowly
animal indeed, unable or unwilling to distinguish usefully between
thoughts, verbal expressions, and overt acts - all of which are linked
for Matsuda in an irresistible causal "connection." Thus, apparently
32. Delgado, Professor Delgado Replies, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593, 596 (1983).
33. Id.
34. Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2321. Matsuda suggests a framework for considering whether
racist language merits public sanction:
In order to distinguish the worst, paradigm example of racist hate messages from
other forms of racist and nonracist speech, three identifying characteristics are
suggested here:
1. The message is of racial inferiority;
2. The message is directed against a historically oppressed group; and
3. The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.
Id. at 2357.
35. Id. at 2335.
36. Id. at 2341 (quoting the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195).
37. Id. at 2342.
38. Matsuda implies that our physical safety is threatened by the mere existence of racist
ideas: "Racial supremacy is one of the ideas we have collectively and internationally considered
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
"mere" verbal behavior like "call[ing] the holocaust a myth" is just as
harmful as, can usefully be analogized to, and should receive no more
legal protection than "removing body parts without [a] survivor's per-
mission[,] . . .malicious mishandling of [a] deceased husband's re-
mains," and "failure to properly cremate and scatter remains as prom-
ised." 39
Matsuda speaks with the sovereign confidence and authority of one
who knows which ideas are worthy of being thought and which are
unthinkable, which words may be spoken and which are unspeakable. 40
"Hateful verbal attacks upon dominant-group members by victims,"
for example, are "permissible."'4, But "when that speech is used to
attack a subordinated-group member, using language of persecution,
and adopting a rhetoric of racial inferiority, I am inclined to prohibit
such speech. '42
Matsuda is inclined to prohibit much more than expressly racist
verbal attacks. Thus, even though the revisionist histories distributed
by anti-Semitic hate groups are sometimes "cunningly devoid" of
explicit hate language, she is "inclined to criminalize" them anyway.-
Further, state intervention against those who collect racist
memorabilia "might be appropriate," at least "where collectors' dis-
plays cause gratuitous harm to viewers."- And Matsuda concludes
and rejected. As an idea connected to continuing racism and degradation of minority groups, it
causes real harm to its victims. We are not safe when these violent words are among us." Id.
at 2360.
39. See id. at 2366, 2367 n.234 (citations omitted).
40. Matsuda argues that present judgments of racist speech should be informed by the
historical "bad acts" of those espousing similar ideas: "This Article calls for an end of...
unknowing .... It is more honest, and less cynically manipulative of legal doctrine, to legislate
openly against the worst forms of racist speech, allowing ourselves to know what we know."
Id. at 2374.
41. Id. at 2358; cf. id. at 2361-63 (arguing that in the case of the "angry nationalist,"
dominant group members may be hurt by an attack on their ethnicity, but "[t]he dominant
group member . . . is more likely to have access to a safe harbor").
42. Id. at 2363-64 (emphasis added). The contextual relativity in the definition of "dominant
groups" and "subordinate groups" is highlighted by Matsuda's examination of Zionism:
If a Zionist's expression of anger includes a statement of generic white supremacy
and persecution, the speaker chooses to ally with a larger, historically dominant
group, and the victim's privilege should not apply. On the other hand, angry,
survivalist expression, arising out of the Jewish experience of persecution and
without resort to the rhetoric of generic white supremacy, is protected under the
contextualized approach.
Id. at 2364.
43. Id. at 2366 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 2368.
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that the "danger of... missing . . . the ironic message" in Mark
Twain's use of "racist dialogue to portray a racist land" presents the
danger that "Mark Twain's realism, in some schools, will cause the
kind of harm Twain himself would have abhorred. We need safe har-
bors before we begin rocking boats. '45
By contrast, "a rapid-fire sequence of racial epithets spoken by
characters from different racial groups" in Spike Lee's film Do the
Right Thing"6 is apparently acceptable, because the film offers "an
incisive anti-racist critique of racist speech. '47 (When in doubt, consult
"the experience of victim-group members [as] a guide.") Even our
universities, which traditionally have been institutions specifically de-
voted to the free exchange of ideas49 - "safe harbors" for freedom of
expression, where boats may safely be rocked - should impose stricter
controls on speech than society at large, because "[o]fficial tolerance
of racist speech in this setting is more harmful than generalized toler-
ance in the community-at-large." 5°
To appreciate what is at issue, it may be useful to consider some
of the concrete measures Delgado, Matsuda, and other cultural critics
have endorsed to regulate racist speech. Charles R. Lawrence, for
example, claims to propose "narrowly framed restrictions on only the
most abusive, least substantive forms of racist speech."'51 Here is a
campus speech policy that Lawrence terms "the University of Michi-
gan's effort[ ] to provide a safe harbor for its black, hispanic, and
Asian students":52
45. Id. at 2369.
46. Do the Right Thing (Universal Pictures 1989).
47. Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2369.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that the
classroom is "peculiarly the marketplace of ideas"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)
("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ('"The essentiality
of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident."); Byrne, Academic
Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989) (discussing
the meaning of academic freedom as defined by the Constitution, the courts, and the academic
community); Gunther, Good Speech, Bad Speech, 42 STAN. LAW., Spr. 1990, at 4, 7 ("University
campuses should exhibit greater, not less, freedom of expression than prevails in society at
large."); Schmidt, Wisdom Hath Builded Her House, The Inaugural Address of Benno C. Schmidt,
Jr., Twentieth President of Yale University (Sept. 20, 1986) ('The foundation of [our central]
mission is academic freedom and absolute adherence to freedom of expression . . . ."). Cf.
Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399, 400, 419-22
(1991) (excluding from the class of actionable racial insults those that are unfalsifiable).
50. Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2371.
51. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 431, 473.
52. Id. at 480.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Persons are subject to discipline for]
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or vic-
timizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and
that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's
academic efforts, employment, participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of
interfering with an individual's academic efforts, employ-
ment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environ-
ment for educational pursuits, employment or participation
in University sponsored extra-curricular activities.5
The University also issued an "interpretive guide" to its policy
that included the following examples of punishable behavior: failing
to invite a student of another race, sex, sexual orientation, or ethnic
origin to a floor party or study group; laughing at an improper joke;
and "comment[ing] in a derogatory way" about the "physical appear-
ance[,] sexual orientation[,] cultural origins, or religious beliefs" of
another person or group.5
The University's policy was decisively invalidated in its first legal
challenge as "clear[ly] . . .overbroad both on its face and as applied"
and "so vague that its enforcement would violate the due process
clause. '55 Applying elementary constitutional principles, the court cited
53. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In Doe, after
litigation commenced, the University withdrew section 1(c) on the grounds that "a need exists
for further explanation and clarification of [that section] of the policy." Id. One commentator
sadly observed that "a university that was once dedicated to maximum freedom of mind and
conscience now finds itself struggling to guarantee the minimum freedom insisted on by the
law." D. D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 144 (1991) (emphasis added). "During the contro-
versy, the administration's approach [was] to steer within constitutional boundaries while impos-
ing maximum permissible restraints on what students [could] say." Id. at 155.
The threat to universities as "safe harbors" seems more immediate when one considers that
the University of Michigan is not an obscure, provincial institution but one of the nation's most
prominent and distinguished research universities.
54. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 857-58. Various students found in violation of the policy were
sentenced to "educational" punishments that would "sensitize" them. Id. at 857, 861, 865. Charges
against one student were dropped after the student agreed to recant in a letter of apology to
the Michigan Daily entitled "Learned My Lesson." Id. at 865; D. D'SOUZA, supra note 53, at 148.
55. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866-67. The Doe court stated that the policy sweeps within its
scope "a significant amount" of speech that is "unquestionably protected . . . under the First
Amendment." Id. at 853.
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fourteen United States Supreme Court cases for the proposition that
the University could not prohibit speech because it "disagreed with
ideas or messages sought to be conveyed" or because a large number
of people found the speech "to be offensive, even gravely so." With
the policy in force, Salman Rushdie would certainly be ill-advised to
venture onto the University of Michigan campus for a reading from
his Satanic Verses.57 And large numbers of law professors might also
be in violation, if the following description of their teaching is at all
representative:
The classroom is hierarchical with a vengeance, the teacher
receiving a degree of deference and arousing fears that re-
mind one of high school rather than college. The sense of
autonomy one has in a lecture - with the rule that you
must let the teacher drone on without interruption, balanced
by the rule that he can't do anything to you - is gone. In
its place is a demand for pseudo-participation in which one
struggles desperately, in front of a large audience, to read
a mind determined to elude you. It is ... humiliating to be
frightened and unsure of oneself, especially when what ren-
ders one unsure is a classroom arrangement that suggests
at once the patriarchal family and a Kafka-like riddle-state. 5
Another example of "hate speech" regulation is the following section
from the Swedish Penal Code that Matsuda cites approvingly as a
model for criminal legislation in this country:
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other
communication which is spread among the public threatens
or expresses contempt for an ethnic group or other such
group of persons with allusion to race, skincolour, national
or ethnic origin or religious creed, he shall be sentenced for
agitation against [an] ethnic group to imprisonment for at
most two years [or,] if the crime is petty, to pay a fine. 9
56. Id. at 863.
57. S. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1989).
58. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC.
591, 593 (1982).
More recently, the University of Wisconsin's efforts to provide the minimum level of protec-
tion for free speech on its campuses have also been held unconstitutional. See The UWM Post
v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). The court noted that the invalidated
policy had been drafted "[w~ith the help of UW-Madison Law School Professor[ ] ... Richard
Delgado." Id. at 1165.
59. Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2348 n.147 (quoting SWED. PENAL CODE ch. 16, § 8 (em-
phasis added)).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
It is more than a little ironic that Matsuda and other cultural critics
now favor the very sorts of restrictions on the content6 of thought,
expression, and symbolic conduct that were used against progressive
activists of earlier eras and, in particular, against the civil rights and
antiwar movements of the 1960s. In Street v. New York,61 for example,
a black man had been convicted of "contempt[uously]" burning an
American flag to protest the shooting of civil rights leader James
Meredith.62 Similarly, in Smith v. Goguen,- the appellee had been
convicted of "contemptuously" wearing an American flag sewn to the
seat of his pants.- In Cohen v. California,6 the appellant had been
convicted of "offensive conduct" for wearing a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" in the Los Angeles County Courthouse.6 More re-
cently, in Texas v. Johnson,67 the petitioner had been convicted of
causing "serious offense" to others by burning an American flag at
the 1984 Republican National Convention, as part of a protest against
Reagan administration policies.6
The Supreme Court overturned all of these convictions and in so
doing elaborated highly speech-protective principles for the benefit of
these and other minorities, outsiders, protesters, and politically disfa-
vored groups. 69 As the Court concluded recently in United States v.
Eichman,70 using language that seems almost tailor-made for the "hate
speech" problem,
60. See id. at 2374 (content-neutrality as a "trap"); id. at 2357 ("Setting aside the worst
forms of racist speech for special treatment is a non-neutral, value-laden approach that will
better preserve free speech.").
61. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
62. Id. The Street Court rejected content-based restrictions on speech: "It is firmly settled
that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because
the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." Id. at 592.
63. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
64. Id.
65. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
66. Id. The appellant had testified that he wore the jacket "as a means of informing the
public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft." Id. at 16.
67. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
68. Id. at 399. "At his trial, Johnson explained his reasons for burning the flag as follows:
'The American Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And
a more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you agree with it or not, couldn't have
been made at that time."' Id. at 405.
69. Id. at 420; Smith, 415 U.S. at 582; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; Street, 394 U.S. at 594. See
also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (All these cases involved convictions of Jehovah's
Witnesses for various forms of more or less ineffectual religious proselytizing.).
70. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
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We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive
to many. But the same might be said, for example, of virulent
ethnic and religious epithets... vulgar repudiations of the
draft . . . and scurrilous caricatures. . . "If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or dis-
agreeable.' '71
Sometimes, though, the doctrine of content- and viewpoint-neutral-
ity works the other way around. In 1949 the Supreme Court upheld
the right of a racist named Terminiello to give a speech that "vigor-
ously, if not viciously" insulted various racial and political groups
and "followed, with fidelity that [was] more than coincidental, the
pattern of European fascist leaders."'13 In overturning Terminiello's
conviction for "stir[ring] the public to anger, invit[ing] dispute,
bring[ing] about a condition of unrest, or creat[ing] a disturbance,"
Justice Douglas penned for the Court a ringing endorsement of toler-
ance that has become a landmark of constitutional law:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike
at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unset-
tling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea ...
[T]he alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either
by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community
groups.74
The Terminiello doctrine was then expressly relied on as the basis
for decision in Street,7s Cohen,76 Johnson, and Eichman,78 and in such
civil rights victories as Edwards v. South Carolina,79 Cox v.
71. Id. at 2410 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
72. Terniniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949).
73. Id. at 22 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 4-5.
75. Street, 493 U.S. at 591-92.
76. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
77. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-09.
78. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2410.
79. 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963).
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Louisiana,80 Brown v. Louisiana,s' and New York Times v. Sullivan.8
"Time and again during the 1960s and 1970s, the ACLU and other
civil rights groups were able to defend free speech rights for civil
rights demonstrators by relying on the Terminiello decision."- And
I predict that the Court will likewise rely on Terminiello to invalidate
the following "hate speech" regulation that is now before it for review:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, ob-
ject, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 4
In the academy, meanwhile, the "centrist" is effectively being
forced off center stage by "a highly contextualized analysis and a range
of relevant evidence quite at odds with that found in typical legal
inquiry." 5 This new analysis "makes . . . relevant knowledge as old
as the Torah and as new as the back page of this morning's news-
paper."so With the reach of the law thus broadened to the distant legal
horizon, positions and principles that once lay at the very center of
liberal, tolerant orthodoxy - such as the principle that "we should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opin-
ions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death" - increas-
ingly count as "absolutist" or even "extremist."89
80. 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965).
81. 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1, 135 (1966).
82. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
83. Strossen, supra note 27, at 537. Similarly, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
the Court upheld the free speech rights of a Ku Klux Klan leader in a decision that produced
"the most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court." Gunther, Learned
Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975).
84. St. Paul, Minn., Leg. Code § 292.02 (1990). See Matter of Welfare of R.A.V., 464
N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (finding St. Paul's bias-motivated disorderly conduct ordinance constitu-
tional and reinstating charges against an individual for burning a cross inside the fenced yard
of an African-American family's home); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991)
(granting petition for writ of certiorari).
85. Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2373.
86. Id. at 2373-74.
87. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 51, at 461, 467, 477; Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2321,
2323, 2356, 2376, 2380.
89. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2346, 2350, 2353.
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CULTURAL CRITIQUE AND LEGAL CHANGE
Ours is a needy age, and it has witnessed the decline, if not break-
down, of virtually all important cultural institutions.9' Our politics has
degenerated into "national housekeeping 91 and the electronic manipu-
lation of slogans and images.9 Our educational institutions seem to
have found their full and sufficient calling in preparing students for,
and testing them on, multiple-choice examinations.93 And in contempo-
rary music it is increasingly difficult to detect what used to be called
the "elements" of melody, harmony, and rhythm.Y
In the midst of this postmodern "articulation crisis," it is little
wonder that the values of freedom of thought and expression count
for so little, and that traditional liberal tolerance and the American
"ideology of freedom"95 could be seen as "an extreme commitment to
the first amendment at the expense of antidiscrimination goals."'' Yet
even Matsuda concedes that this ideology of freedom "has contributed
to social progress and the limitation of repression,"'' and it may even
have made the current new left cultural critiques possible. Before that
tradition is definitively discarded, then, perhaps what we need, more
than anything else, is a truly centrist cultural critique.
90. See R. BELLASI, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, THE GOOD
SOCIETY (1991); P. FUSSELL, BAD: OR, THE DUMBING OP AMERICA (1991).
91. See H. ARENDT, THE HumAN CONDITION 2-78 (1971).
92. See generally Collins & Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68
TEx. L. REV. 1087 (1990); Tierney, Sound Bites Become Smaller Mouthfuls, N.Y. Times, Jan.
23, 1992, at Al, col. 2 (national ed.) (articles detailing the degeneration of political discourse
in the age of television).
93. See De Witt, In Vermont Schools, Test on How Well Students Think Draws New
Interest, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1991, at A10, col. 1 (national ed.).
94. See generally V. ZUCKERKANDL, THE SENSE OF MUSIC (1959) (explaining the elements
of music).
95. Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2353.
96. Id. at 2346.
97. Id. at 2353.

